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ABSTRACT 
From Enron, WorldCom and Satyam, it appears that corporate accounting fraud is a major problem that is increasing 
both in its frequency and severity. Research evidence has shown that growing number of frauds have undermined the 
integrity of financial reports, contributed to substantial economic losses, and eroded investors’ confidence regarding the 
usefulness and reliability of financial statements. The increasing rate of white-collar crimes demands stiff penalties, 
exemplary punishments, and effective enforcement of law with the right spirit. An attempt is made to examine and ana- 
lyze in-depth the Satyam Computer’s “creative-accounting” scandal, which brought to limelight the importance of 
“ethics and corporate governance” (CG). The fraud committed by the founders of Satyam in 2009, is a testament to the 
fact that “the science of conduct is swayed in large by human greed, ambition, and hunger for power, money, fame and 
glory”. Unlike Enron, which sank due to “agency” problem, Satyam was brought to its knee due to ‘tunneling’ effect. 
The Satyam scandal highlights the importance of securities laws and CG in ‘emerging’ markets. Indeed, Satyam fraud 
“spurred the government of India to tighten the CG norms to prevent recurrence of similar frauds in future”. Thus, ma- 
jor financial reporting frauds need to be studied for “lessons-learned” and “strategies-to-follow” to reduce the incidents 
of such frauds in the future. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. What Is Fraud? 
Fraud is a worldwide phenomenon that affects all conti- 
nents and all sectors of the economy. Fraud encompasses 
a wide-range of illicit practices and illegal acts involving 
intentional deception, or misrepresentation. According to 
the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), 
fraud is “a deception or misrepresentation that an indi- 
vidual or entity makes knowing that misrepresentation 
could result in some unauthorized benefit to the individ- 
ual or to the entity or some other party” [1]. In other 
words, mistakes are not fraud. Indeed, in fraud, groups of 
unscrupulous individuals manipulate, or influence the 
activities of a target business with the intention of mak- 
ing money, or obtaining goods through illegal or unfair 
means. Fraud cheats the target organization of its legiti- 
mate income and results in a loss of goods, money, and 
even goodwill and reputation. Fraud often employs ille- 
gal and immoral, or unfair means. It is essential that or-  
ganizations build processes, procedures and controls that 
do not needlessly put employees in a position to commit 
fraud and that effectively detect fraudulent activity if it 
occurs. The fraud involving persons from the leadership 
level is known under the name “managerial fraud” and 
the one involving only entity’s employees is named 
“fraud by employees’ association”.  
1.2. Magnitude of Fraud Losses: A Glimpse 
Organizations of all types and sizes are subject to fraud. 
On a number of occasions over the past few decades, 
major public companies have experienced financial re- 
porting fraud, resulting in turmoil in the capital markets, 
a loss of shareholder value, and, in some cases, the 
bankruptcy of the company itself. Although, it is gener- 
ally accepted that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has improved 
corporate governance and decreased the incidence of 
fraud, recent studies and surveys indicate that investors 
and management continue to have concerns about finan- 
cial statement fraud. For example: 
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 The ACFE’s “2010 Report to the Nations on Occupa- 
tional Fraud and Abuse” [1] found that financial 
statement fraud, while representing less than five 
percent of the cases of fraud in its report, was by far 
the most costly, with a median loss of $1.7 million 
per incident. Survey participants estimated that the 
typical organization loses 5% of its revenues to fraud 
each year. Applied to the 2011 Gross World Product, 
this figure translates to a potential projected annual 
fraud loss of more than $3.5 trillion. The median loss 
caused by the occupational fraud cases in our study 
was $140,000. More than one-fifth of these cases 
caused losses of at least $1 million. The frauds re- 
ported to us lasted a median of 18 months before be- 
ing detected. 
 “Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007”, from 
the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission (the 2010 COSO Fraud Re- 
port) [2], analyzed 347 frauds investigated by the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from 
1998 to 2007 and found that the median dollar 
amount of each instance of fraud had increased three 
times from the level in a similar 1999 study, from a 
median of $4.1 million in the 1999 study to $12 mil- 
lion. In addition, the median size of the company in- 
volved in fraudulent financial reporting increased ap- 
proximately six-fold, from $16 million to $93 million 
in total assets and from $13 million to $72 million in 
revenues. 
 A “2009 KPMG Survey” [3] of 204 executives of US 
companies with annual revenues of $250 million or 
more found that 65 percent of the respondents con- 
sidered fraud to be a significant risk to their organiza- 
tions in the next year, and more than one-third of 
those identified financial reporting fraud as one of the 
highest risks.  
 Fifty-six percent of the approximately 2100 business 
professionals surveyed during a “Deloitte Forensic 
Center” [4] webcast about reducing fraud risk pre- 
dicted that more financial statement fraud would be 
uncovered in 2010 and 2011 as compared to the pre- 
vious three years. Almost half of those surveyed (46 
percent) pointed to the recession as the reason for this 
increase. 
 According to “Annual Fraud Indicator 2012” con- 
ducted by the National Fraud Authority (UK) [5], 
“The scale of fraud losses in 2012, against all victims 
in the UK, is in the region of £73 billion per annum. In 
2006, 2010 and 2011, it was £13, £30 and £38 billions, 
respectively. The 2012 estimate is significantly greater 
than the previous figures because it includes new and 
improved estimates in a number of areas, in particular 
against the private sector. Fraud harms all areas of the 
UK economy”. 
Moreover, financial statement fraud was a contributing 
factor to the recent financial crisis and it threatened the 
efficiency, liquidity and safety of both debt and capital 
markets [6]. Furthermore, it has significantly increased 
uncertainty and volatility in financial markets, shaking 
investor confidence worldwide. It also reduces the cred- 
itability of financial information that investors use in 
investment decisions. When taking into account the loss 
of investor confidence, as well as, reputational damage 
and potential fines and criminal actions, it is clear why 
financial misstatements should be every manager’s worst 
fraud-related nightmare [7].  
1.3. Who Commits Frauds? 
Everyday, there are revelations of organizations behaving 
in discreditable ways [8]. Generally, there are three 
groups of business people who commit financial state- 
ment frauds. They range from senior management (CEO 
and CFO); mid- and lower-level management and organ- 
izational criminals [9]. CEOs and CFOs commit ac- 
counting frauds to conceal true business performance, to 
preserve personal status and control and to maintain per- 
sonal income and wealth. Mid- and lower-level employ- 
yees falsify financial statements related to their area of 
responsibility (subsidiary, division or other unit) to con- 
ceal poor performance and/or to earn performance-based 
bonuses. Organizational criminals falsify financial sta- 
tements to obtain loans, or to inflate a stock they plan to 
sell in a “pump-and-dump” scheme. While many chan- 
ges in financial audit processes have stemmed from fi- 
nancial fraud, or manipulations, history and related re- 
search repeatedly demonstrates that a financial audit 
simply cannot be relied upon to detect fraud at any sig- 
nificant level.  
1.4. Consequences of Fraudulent Reporting 
Fraudulent financial reporting can have significant con- 
sequences for the organization and its stakeholders, as 
well as for public confidence in the capital markets. Pe- 
riodic high-profile cases of fraudulent financial reporting 
also raise concerns about the credibility of the US fi- 
nancial reporting process and call into question the roles 
of management, auditors, regulators, and analysts, among 
others. Moreover, corporate fraud impacts organizations 
in several areas: financial, operational and psychological 
[10]. While the monetary loss owing to fraud is signifi- 
cant, the full impact of fraud on an organization can be 
staggering. In fact, the losses to reputation, goodwill, and 
customer relations can be devastating. When fraudulent 
financial reporting occurs, serious consequences ensue. 
The damage that result is also widespread, with a some- 
times devastating “ripple” effect [6]. Those affected may 
range from the “immediate” victims (the company’s 
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stockholders and creditors) to the more “remote” (those 
harmed when investor confidence in the stock market is 
shaken). Between these two extremes, many others may 
be affected: “employees” who suffer job loss or dimin- 
ished pension fund value; “depositors” in financial insti- 
tutions; the company’s “underwriters, auditors, attorneys, 
and insurers”; and even honest “competitors” whose 
reputations suffer by association.  
As fraud can be perpetrated by any employee within 
an organization or by those from the outside, therefore, it 
is important to have an effective “fraud management” 
program in place to safeguard your organization’s assets 
and reputation. Thus, prevention and earlier detection of 
fraudulent financial reporting must start with the entity 
that prepares financial reports. Given the current state of 
the economy and recent corporate scandals, fraud is still 
a top concern for corporate executives. In fact, the 
sweeping regulations of Sarbanes-Oxley, designed to 
help prevent and detect corporate fraud, have exposed 
fraudulent practices that previously may have gone un- 
detected. Additionally, more corporate executives are 
paying fines and serving prison time than ever before. No 
industry is immune to fraudulent situations and the nega- 
tive publicity that swirls around them. The implications 
for management are clear: every organization is vulner- 
able to fraud, and managers must know how to detect it, 
or at least, when to suspect it. 
2. Review of Literature 
Starting in the late 1990s, a wave of corporate frauds in 
the United States occurred with Enron’s failure perhaps 
being the emblematic example. Jeffords [11] examined 
910 cases of frauds submitted to the “Internal Auditor” 
during the nine-year period from 1981 to 1989 to assess 
the specific risk factors cited in the Treadway Commis- 
sion Report. He concluded that “approximately 63 per- 
cent of the 910 fraud cases are classified under the inter- 
nal control risks”. In addition, Smith [12] offered a “ty- 
pology” of individuals who embezzle. He indicated that 
embezzlers are “opportunist’s type”, who quickly detects 
the lack of weakness in internal control and seizes the 
opportunity to use the deficiency to his benefit. Similarly, 
Ziegenfuss [13] performed a study to determine the 
amount and type of fraud occurring in “state and local” 
governments. His study revealed that the most frequently 
occurring types of fraud are misappropriation of assets, 
theft, false representation; and false invoice.  
On the other hand, Haugen and Selin [14] in their 
study discussed the value of “internal” controls, which 
depends largely on management’s integrity and the ready 
availability of computer technology, which assisted in 
the commitment of crime. Sharma and Brahma [15] em- 
phasized on “bankers” responsibility on frauds; bank 
frauds could crop-up in all spheres of bank’s dealing. 
Major cause for perpetration of fraud is laxity in obser- 
vance in laid-down system and procedures by supervis- 
ing staff. Harris and William [16], however, examined 
the reasons for “loan” frauds in banks and emphasized on 
due diligence program. Beirstaker, Brody, Pacini [17] in 
their study proposed numerous fraud protection and de- 
tection techniques. Moreover, Willison [18] examined 
the causes that led to the breakdown of “Barring” Bank. 
The collapse resulted due to the failures in management, 
financial and operational controls of Baring Banks.  
Choo and Tan [19] explained corporate fraud by relat- 
ing the “fraud-triangle” to the “broken trust theory” and 
to an “American Dream” theory, which originates from 
the sociological literature, while Schrand and Zechman 
[20] relate executive over-confidence to the commitment 
of fraud. Moreover, Bhasin [21] examined the reasons 
for “check” frauds, the magnitude of frauds in Indian 
banks, and the manner, in which the expertise of internal 
auditors can be integrated, in order to detect and prevent 
frauds in banks by taking “proactive” steps to combat 
frauds. Chen [22] in his study examined “unethical” lead- 
ership in the companies and compares the role of unethi- 
cal leaders in a variety of scenarios. Through the use of 
computer simulation models, he shows how a combina- 
tion of CEO’s narcissism, financial incentive, sharehold- 
ers’ expectations and subordinate silence as well as 
CEO’s dishonesty can do much to explain some of the 
findings highlighted in recent high-profile financial ac- 
counting scandals. According to a research study 
performed by Cecchini et al. [23], the authors provided a 
methodology for detecting “management” fraud using 
basic financial data based on “support vector machines”.  
From the above, it is evident that majority of studies 
were performed in developed, Western countries. How- 
ever, the manager’s behavior in fraud commitment has 
been relatively unexplored so far. Accordingly, the ob- 
jective of this paper is to examine managers’ unethical 
behaviors in Satyam Computer Limited, which constitute 
an ex-post evaluation of alleged or acknowledged fraud 
case. Unfortunately, no study has been conducted to ex- 
amine behavioral aspects of manager’s in the perpetua- 
tion of corporate frauds in the context of a developing 
economy, like India. Hence, the present study seeks to 
fill this gap and contributes to the literature.  
3. Research Methodology, Objectives and  
Sources of Information  
Financial reporting practice can be developed by refer- 
ence to a particular setting in which it is embedded. 
Therefore, “qualitative” research could be seen useful to 
explore and describe fraudulent financial reporting prac- 
tice. Here, two issues are crucial. First, to understand why 
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and how a “specific” company is committed to fraudulent 
financial reporting practice an appropriate “interpretive” 
research approach is needed. Second, case study con- 
ducted as part of this study, looked specifically at the 
largest fraud case in India, involving Satyam Computer 
Services (Satyam). Labelled as “India’s Enron” by the 
Indian media, the Satyam accounting fraud has compre- 
hensively exposed the failure of the regulatory oversight 
mechanism in India. No doubt, to design better accounting 
systems, we need to understand how accounting systems 
operate in their social, political and economic contexts. 
The main objectives of this study are to: 1) highlight the 
Satyam Computers Limited’s accounting scandal by por- 
traying the sequence of events, the aftermath of events, the 
key parties involved, and major follow-up actions under- 
taken in India; and 2) what lesions can be learned from 
Satyam scam?  
To complement prior literature, we examined docu- 
mented behaviors in cases of Satyam corporate scandal, 
using the evidence taken from press articles, and also 
applied a “content” analysis to them. In terms of infor- 
mation collection “methodology”, we searched for evi- 
dence from the press coverage contained in the “Factiva” 
database. Thus, present study is primarily based on “sec- 
ondary” sources of data (EBSCO host database) gathered 
from the related literature published in the journals, 
newspaper, books, statements, reports. However, as 
stated earlier, the nature of study is “primarily qualita- 
tive, descriptive and analytical”.  
4. Corporate Accounting Scandal at Satyam  
Computer Services Limited: A Case  
Study of India’s Enron  
Ironically, Satyam means “truth” in the ancient Indian 
language “Sanskrit” [24]. Satyam won the “Golden Pea- 
cock Award” for the best governed company in 2007 and 
in 2009. From being India’s IT “crown jewel” and the 
country’s “fourth largest” company with high-profile 
customers, the outsourcing firm Satyam Computers has 
become embroiled in the nation’s biggest corporate scam 
in living memory [25]. Mr. Ramalinga Raju (Chairman 
and Founder of Satyam; henceforth called “Raju”), who 
has been arrested and has confessed to a $1.47 billion (or 
Rs. 7800 crore) fraud, admitted that he had made up 
profits for years. According to reports, Raju and his 
brother, B. Rama Raju, who was the Managing Director, 
“hid the deception from the company’s board, senior 
managers, and auditors”. The case of Satyam’s account- 
ing fraud has been dubbed as “India’s Enron”. In order to 
evaluate and understand the severity of Satyam’s fraud, it 
is important to understand factors that contributed to the 
“unethical” decisions made by the company’s executives. 
First, it is necessary to detail the rise of Satyam as a 
competitor within the global IT services market-place. 
Second, it is helpful to evaluate the driving-forces behind 
Satyam’s decisions: Ramalinga Raju. Finally, attempt to 
learn some “lessons” from Satyam fraud for the future. 
4.1. Emergence of Satyam Computer Services  
Limited 
Satyam Computer Services Limited was a “rising-star” in 
the Indian “outsourced” IT-services industry. The com- 
pany was formed in 1987 in Hyderabad (India) by Mr. 
Ramalinga Raju. The firm began with 20 employees and 
grew rapidly as a “global” business. It offered IT and 
business process outsourcing services spanning various 
sectors. Satyam was as an example of “India’s growing 
success”. Satyam won numerous awards for innovation, 
governance, and corporate accountability. “In 2007, Ernst 
& Young awarded Mr. Raju with the ‘Entrepreneur of the 
Year’ award. On April 14, 2008, Satyam won awards 
from MZ Consult’s for being a ‘leader in India in CG and 
accountability’. In September 2008, the World Council 
for Corporate Governance awarded Satyam with the 
‘Global Peacock Award’ for global excellence in corpo- 
rate accountability” [26]. Unfortunately, less than five 
months after winning the Global Peacock Award, Satyam 
became the centerpiece of a “massive” accounting fraud. 
By 2003, Satyam’s IT services businesses included 
13,120 technical associates servicing over 300 customers 
worldwide. At that time, the world-wide IT services 
market was estimated at nearly $400 billion, with an es- 
timated annual compound growth rate of 6.4%. “The 
markets major drivers at that point in time were the in- 
creased importance of IT services to businesses world- 
wide; the impact of the Internet on eBusiness; the emer- 
gence of a high‐quality IT services industry in India and 
their methodologies; and, the growing need of IT ser- 
vices providers who could provide a range of services”. 
To effectively compete, both against domestic and global 
competitors, the company embarked on a variety of 
multi‐pronged business growth strategies.  
From 2003-2008, in nearly all financial metrics of in- 
terest to investors, the company grew measurably. Sat- 
yam generated USD $467 million in total sales. By 
March 2008, the company had grown to USD $2.1 bil- 
lion. The company demonstrated “an annual compound 
growth rate of 35% over that period”. Operating profits 
averaged 21%. Earnings per share similarly grew, from 
$0.12 to $0.62, at a compound annual growth rate of 40%. 
Over the same period (2003‐2009), the company was 
trading at an average trailing EBITDA multiple of 15.36. 
Finally, beginning in January 2003, at a share price of 
138.08 INR, Satyam’s stock would peak at 526.25 
INR—a 300% improvement in share price after nearly 
five years. Satyam clearly generated significant corporate 
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growth and shareholder value. The company was a lead- 
ing star—and a recognizable name—in a global IT mar- 
ketplace. The external environment in which Satyam 
operated was indeed beneficial to the company’s growth. 
But, the numbers did not represent the full picture. The 
case of Satyam accounting fraud has been dubbed as 
“India’s Enron”. 
4.2. Mr. Ramalinga Raju and the Satyam Scandal 
On January 7, 2009, Mr. Raju disclosed in a letter (see 
Annexure) to Satyam Computers Limited Board of Di- 
rectors that “he had been manipulating the company’s 
accounting numbers for years”. Mr. Raju claimed that he 
overstated assets on Satyam’s balance sheet by $1.47 
billion. Nearly $1.04 billion in bank loans and cash that 
the company claimed to own was non-existent. Satyam 
also underreported liabilities on its balance sheet. Satyam 
overstated income nearly every quarter over the course of 
several years in order to meet analyst expectations. For 
example, the results announced on October 17, 2009 
overstated quarterly revenues by 75 percent and profits by 
97 percent. Mr. Raju and the company’s global head of 
internal audit used a number of different techniques to 
perpetrate the fraud. “Using his personal computer, Mr. 
Raju created numerous bank statements to advance the 
fraud. Mr. Raju falsified the bank accounts to inflate the 
balance sheet with balances that did not exist. He inflated 
the income statement by claiming interest income from 
the fake bank accounts. Mr. Raju also revealed that he 
created 6000 fake salary accounts over the past few years 
and appropriated the money after the company deposited 
it. The company’s global head of internal audit created 
fake customer identities and generated fake invoices 
against their names to inflate revenue. The global head of 
internal audit also forged board resolutions and illegally 
obtained loans for the company” [27]. It also appeared 
that the cash that the company raised through American 
Depository Receipts in the United States never made it to 
the balance sheets. 
Greed for money, power, competition, success and 
prestige compelled Mr. Raju to “ride the tiger”, which led 
to violation of all duties imposed on them as fiduciar- 
ies—the duty of care, the duty of negligence, the duty of 
loyalty, the duty of disclosure towards the stakeholders. 
“The Satyam scandal is a classic case of negligence of 
fiduciary duties, total collapse of ethical standards, and a 
lack of corporate social responsibility. It is human greed 
and desire that led to fraud. This type of behavior can be 
traced to: greed overshadowing the responsibility to meet 
fiduciary duties; fierce competition and the need to im- 
press stakeholders especially investors, analysts, share- 
holders, and the stock market; low ethical and moral 
standards by top management; and, greater emphasis on 
short‐term performance” [28]. According to CBI, the In- 
dian crime investigation agency, the fraud activity dates 
back from April 1999, when the company embarked on a 
road to double-digit annual growth. As of December 2008, 
Satyam had a total market capitalization of $3.2 billion 
dollars. 
Satyam planned to acquire a 51% stake in Maytas In- 
frastructure Limited, a leading infrastructure develop- 
ment, construction and project management company, 
for $300 million. Here, the Rajus’s had a 37% stake. The 
total turnover was $350 million and a net profit of $20 
million. Raju’s also had a 35% share in Maytas Proper- 
ties, another real-estate investment firm. Satyam reve- 
nues exceeded $1 billion in 2006. In April, 2008 Satyam 
became the first Indian company to publish IFRS audited 
financials. On December 16, 2008, the Satyam board, 
including its five independent directors had approved the 
founder’s proposal to buy the stake in Maytas Infrastruc- 
ture and all of Maytas Properties, which were owned by 
family members of Satyam’s Chairman, Ramalinga Raju, 
as fully owned subsidiary for $1.6 billion. Without 
shareholder approval, the directors went ahead with the 
management’s decision. The decision of acquisition was, 
however, reversed twelve hours after investors sold Sat- 
yam’s stock and threatened action against the manage- 
ment. This was followed by the law-suits filed in the US 
contesting Maytas deal. The World Bank banned Satyam 
from conducting business for 8 years due to inappropri- 
ate payments to staff and inability to provide information 
sought on invoices. Four independent directors quit the 
Satyam board and SEBI ordered promoters to disclose 
pledged shares to stock exchange. 
Investment bank DSP Merrill Lynch, which was ap- 
pointed by Satyam to look for a partner or buyer for the 
company, ultimately blew the whistle and terminated its 
engagement with the company soon after it found finan- 
cial irregularities [29]. On 7 January 2009, Saytam’s 
Chairman, Ramalinga Raju, resigned after notifying 
board members and the Securities and Exchange Board 
of India (SEBI) that Satyam’s accounts had been falsified. 
Raju confessed that Satyam’s balance sheet of September 
30, 2008, contained the following irregularies: “He faked 
figures to the extent of Rs. 5040 crore of non-existent 
cash and bank balances as against Rs. 5361 crore in the 
books, accrued interest of Rs. 376 crore (non-existent), 
understated liability of Rs. 1230 crore on account of 
funds raised by Raju, and an overstated debtor’s position 
of Rs. 490 crore. He accepted that Satyam had reported 
revenue of Rs. 2700 crore and an operating margin of Rs. 
649 crore, while the actual revenue was Rs. 2112 crore 
and the margin was Rs. 61 crore”. In other words, Raju: 
1) inflated figures for cash and bank balances of US 
$1.04 billion vs. US $1.1 billion reflected in the books; 2) 
an accrued interest of US $77.46 million which was non- 
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existent; 3) an understated liability of US $253.38 mil- 
lion on account of funds was arranged by himself; and 4) 
an overstated debtors' position of US $100.94 million vs. 
US $546.11 million in the books. 
Raju claimed in the same letter that “neither he nor the 
managing director had benefited financially from the 
inflated revenues, and none of the board members had 
any knowledge of the situation in which the company 
was placed”. The fraud took place to divert company 
funds into real-estate investment, keep high earnings per 
share, raise executive compensation, and make huge 
profits by selling stake at inflated price. The gap in the 
balance sheet had arisen purely on account of inflated 
profits over a period that lasted several years starting in 
April 1999. “What accounted as a marginal gap between 
actual operating profit and the one reflected in the books 
of accounts continued to grow over the years. This gap 
reached unmanageable proportions as company opera- 
tions grew significantly”, Ragu explained in his letter to 
the board and shareholders. He went on to explain, 
“Every attempt to eliminate the gap failed, and the 
aborted Maytas acquisition deal was the last attempt to 
fill the fictitious assets with real ones. But the investors 
thought it was a brazen attempt to siphon cash out of 
Satyam, in which the Raju family held a small stake, into 
firms the family held tightly”. Table 1 depicts some parts 
of the Satyam’s fabricated ‘Balance Sheet and Income 
Statement’ and shows the “difference” between “actual” 
and “reported” finances. 
Fortunately, the Satyam deal with Matyas was “sal- 
vageable”. It could have been saved only if “the deal had 
been allowed to go through, as Satyam would have been 
able to use Maytas’ assets to shore up its own books”. 
Raju, who showed “artificial” cash on his books, had 
planned to use this “non-existent” cash to acquire the two 
Maytas companies. As part of their “tunneling” strategy, 
the Satyam promoters had substantially reduced their 
holdings in company from 25.6% in March 2001 to 
8.74% in March 2008. Furthermore, as the promoters 
held a very small percentage of equity (mere 2.18%) on 
December 2008, as shown in Table 2, the concern was 
that poor performance would result in a takeover bid, 
thereby exposing the gap. It was like “riding a tiger, not 
knowing how to get off without being eaten”. The 
aborted Maytas acquisition deal was the final, desperate 
effort to cover up the accounting fraud by bringing some 
real assets into the business. When that failed, Raju con- 
fessed the fraud. Given the stake the Rajus held in Mat- 
yas, pursuing the deal would not have been terribly dif- 
ficult from the perspective of the Raju family. Unlike 
Enron, which sank due to agency problem, Satyam was 
brought to its knee due to tunneling. The company with a 
huge cash pile, with promoters still controlling it with a 
small per cent of shares (less than 3%), and trying to ab-  
Table 1. Fabricated balance sheet and income statement of 
Satyam: as of September 30, 2008. 
Items Rs. in crore Actual Reported Difference
Cash and Bank 
Balances 321 5361 5040 
Accrued Interest on 
Bank Fixed Deposits Nil 376.5 376 
Understated Liability 1230 None 1230 
Overstated Debtors 2161 2651 490 
Total Nil Nil 7136 
Revenues (Q2 FY 2009) 2112 2700 588 
Operating Profits 61 649 588 
 
Table 2. Promoter’s shareholding pattern in Satyam from 
2001 to 2008. 
As on Promoter’s holding in % 
March 2001 25.6 
2002 22.26 
2003 20.74 
2004 17.35 
2005 15.67 
2006 14.02 
2007 8.79 
2008 8.74 
Dec. 2008 2.18 
 
sorb a real-estate company in which they have a majority 
stake is a deadly combination pointing prima facie to 
tunneling [30]. The reason why Ramalinga Raju claims 
that he did it was because every year he was fudging 
revenue figures and since expenditure figures could not 
be fudged so easily, the gap between “actual” profit and 
“book” profit got widened every year. In order to close 
this gap, he had to buy Maytas Infrastructure and Maytas 
Properties. In this way, “fictitious” profits could be ab- 
sorbed through a “self-dealing” process. The auditors, 
bankers, and SEBI, the market watchdog, were all 
blamed for their role in the accounting fraud.  
4.3. The Auditors Role and Factors Contributing  
to Fraud 
Global auditing firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), 
audited Satyam’s books from June 2000 until the discov- 
ery of the fraud in 2009. Several commentators criticized 
PwC harshly for failing to detect the fraud. Indeed, PwC 
signed Satyam’s financial statements and was responsible 
for the numbers under the Indian law. One particularly 
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investors, weak independent directors and audit commit- 
tee, and whistle-blower policy not being effective. 
troubling item concerned the $1.04 billion that Satyam 
claimed to have on its balance sheet in “non-interest- 
bearing” deposits. According to accounting professionals, 
“any reasonable company would have either invested the 
money into an interest-bearing account, or returned the 
excess cash to the shareholders. The large amount of cash 
thus should have been a ‘red-flag’ for the auditors that 
further verification and testing was necessary. Further- 
more, it appears that the auditors did not independently 
verify with the banks in which Satyam claimed to have 
deposits”.  
4.4. Aftermath of Satyam Scandal 
Immediately following the news of the fraud, Merrill 
Lynch terminated its engagement with Satyam, Credit 
Suisse suspended its coverage of Satyam, and Pricewa- 
terhouseCoopers (PwC) came under intense scrutiny and 
its license to operate was revoked. Coveted awards won 
by Satyam and its executive management were stripped 
from the company. Satyam’s shares fell to 11.50 rupees 
on January 10, 2009, their lowest level since March 1998, 
compared to a high of 544 rupees in 2008. In the New 
York Stock Exchange, Satyam shares peaked in 2008 at 
US $ 29.10; by March 2009 they were trading around US 
$1.80. Thus, investors lost $2.82 billion in Satyam. Un- 
fortunately, Satyam significantly inflated its earnings and 
assets for years and rolling down Indian stock markets 
and throwing the industry into turmoil [31]. Criminal 
charges were brought against Mr. Raju, including: 
criminal conspiracy, breach of trust, and forgery. After 
the Satyam fiasco and the role played by PwC, investors 
became wary of those companies who are clients of PwC, 
which resulted in fall in share prices of around 100 com- 
panies varying between 5%  - 15%. The news of the 
scandal (quickly compared with the collapse of Enron) 
sent jitters through the Indian stock market, and the 
benchmark Sensex index fell more than 5%. Shares in 
Satyam fell more than 70%. The chart titled as “Fall from 
grace”, shown in Exhibit 1 depicts the Satyam’s stock 
decline between December 2008 and January 2009. 
Additionally, the Satyam fraud went on for a number of 
years and involved both the manipulation of balance 
sheets and income statements. Whenever Satyam needed 
more income to meet analyst estimates, it simply created 
“fictitious” sources and it did so numerous times, without 
the auditors ever discovering the fraud. Suspiciously, 
Satyam also paid PwC twice what other firms would 
charge for the audit, which raises questions about whether 
PwC was complicit in the fraud. Furthermore, PwC au- 
dited the company for nearly 9 years and did not uncover 
the fraud, whereas Merrill Lynch discovered the fraud as 
part of its due diligence in merely 10 days. Missing these 
“red-flags” implied either that the auditors were grossly 
inept or in collusion with the company in committing the 
fraud. PWC initially asserted that it performed all of the 
company’s audits in accordance with applicable auditing 
standards. 
Numerous factored contributed to the Satyam fraud. 
The independent board members of Satyam, the institu- 
tional investor community, the SEBI, retail investors, and 
the external auditor—none of them, including profes- 
sional investors with detailed information and models 
available to them, detected the malfeasance. The follow- 
ing is a list of factors that contributed to the fraud: greed, 
ambitious corporate growth, deceptive reporting prac- 
tices—lack of transparency, excessive interest in main- 
taining stock prices, executive incentives, stock market 
expectations, nature of accounting rules, ESOPs issued to 
those who prepared fake bills, high risk deals that went 
sour, audit failures (internal and external), aggressiveness 
of investment and commercial banks, rating agencies and  
Immediately after Raju’s revelation about the ac- 
counting fraud, “new” board members were appointed 
and they started working towards a solution that would 
prevent the total collapse of the firm. Indian officials 
acted quickly to try to save Satyam from the same fate 
that met Enron and WorldCom, when they experienced 
large accounting scandals. The Indian government “im- 
mediately started an investigation, while at the same time 
limiting its direct participation, with Satyam because it 
did not want to appear like it was responsible for the  
 
 
Exhibit 1. Stock Charting of Satyam from December 2008 to January 2009. 
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fraud, or attempting to cover up the fraud”. The govern- 
ment appointed a “new” board of directors for Satyam to 
try to save the company. The Board’s goal was “to sell the 
company within 100 days”. To devise a plan of sale, the 
board met with bankers, accountants, lawyers, and gov- 
ernment officials immediately. It worked diligently to 
bring stability and confidence back to the company to 
ensure the sale of the company within the 100-day time 
frame. To accomplish the sale, the board hired Goldman 
Sachs and Avendus Capital and charged them with selling 
the company in the shortest time possible. 
By mid-March, several major players in the IT field had 
gained enough confidence in Satyam’s operations to par- 
ticipate in an auction process for Satyam. The Securities 
and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) appointed a retired 
Supreme Court Justice, Justice Bharucha, to oversee the 
process and instill confidence in the transaction. Several 
companies bid on Satyam on April 13, 2009. The winning 
bidder, Tech Mahindra, bought Satyam for $1.13 per 
share—less than a third of its stock market value before 
Mr. Raju revealed the fraud—and salvaged its operations 
[32]. Both Tech Mahindra and the SEBI are now fully 
aware of the full extent of the fraud and India will not 
pursue further investigations. The stock has again stabi- 
lized from its fall on November 26, 2009 and, as part of 
Tech Mahindra, Saytam is once again on its way toward a 
bright future. 
4.5. Investigation: Criminal and Civil Charges  
The investigation that followed the revelation of the fraud 
has led to charges against several different groups of 
people involved with Satyam. Indian authorities arrested 
Mr. Raju, Mr. Raju’s brother, B. Ramu Raju, its former 
managing director, Srinivas Vdlamani, the company’s 
head of internal audit, and its CFO on criminal charges of 
fraud. Indian authorities also arrested and charged several 
of the company’s auditors (PwC) with fraud. The Institute 
of Chartered Accountants of India [33] ruled that “the 
CFO and the auditor were guilty of professional miscon- 
duct”. The CBI is also in the course of investigating the 
CEO’s overseas assets. There were also several civil 
charges filed in the US against Satyam by the holders of 
its ADRs. The investigation also implicated several Indian 
politicians. Both civil and criminal litigation cases con- 
tinue in India and civil litigation continues in the United 
States. Some of the main victims were: employees, clients, 
shareholders, bankers and Indian government. 
In the aftermath of Satyam, India’s markets recovered 
and Satyam now lives on. India’s stock market is currently 
trading near record highs, as it appears that a global eco- 
nomic recovery is taking place. Civil litigation and 
criminal charges continue against Satyam. Tech Mahindra 
purchased 51% of Satyam on April 16, 2009, successfully 
saving the firm from a complete collapse. With the right 
changes, India can minimize the rate and size of ac- 
counting fraud in the Indian capital markets. 
4.6. Corporate Governance Issues at Satyam 
On a quarterly basis, Satyam earnings grew. Mr. Raju 
admitted that the fraud which he committed amounted to 
nearly $276 million. In the process, Satyam grossly vio- 
lated all rules of corporate governance [34]. The Satyam 
scam had been the example for following “poor” CG 
practices. It had failed to show good relation with the 
shareholders and employees. CG issue at Satyam arose 
because of non-fulfillment of obligation of the company 
towards the various stakeholders. Of specific interest are 
the following: distinguishing the roles of board and 
management; separation of the roles of the CEO and 
chairman; appointment to the board; directors and execu- 
tive compensation; protection of shareholders rights and 
their executives.  
4.7. Lessons Learned from Satyam Scam 
The 2009 Satyam scandal in India highlighted the ne- 
farious potential of an improperly governed corporate 
leader. As the fallout continues, and the effects were felt 
throughout the global economy, the prevailing hope is 
that some good can come from the scandal in terms of 
lessons learned [35]. Here are some lessons learned from 
the Satyam Scandal:  
 Investigate All Inaccuracies: The fraud scheme at 
Satyam started very small, eventually growing into 
$276 million white-elephant in the room. Indeed, a lot 
of fraud schemes initially start out small, with the 
perpetrator thinking that small changes here and there 
would not make a big difference, and is less likely to 
be detected. This sends a message to a lot of com- 
panies: if your accounts are not balancing, or if 
something seems inaccurate (even just a tiny bit), it is 
worth investigating. Dividing responsibilities across a 
team of people makes it easier to detect irregularities 
or misappropriated funds.  
 Ruined Reputations: Fraud does not just look bad on 
a company; it looks bad on the whole industry and a 
country. “India’s biggest corporate scandal in 
memory threatens future foreign investment flows 
into Asia’s third largest economy and casts a cloud 
over growth in its once-booming outsourcing sector. 
The news sent Indian equity markets into a tail-spin, 
with Bombay’s main benchmark index tumbling 
7.3% and the Indian rupee fell”. Now, because of the 
Satyam scandal, Indian rivals will come under greater 
scrutiny by the regulators, investors and customers.  
 Corporate Governance Needs to Be Stronger: The 
Satyam case is just another example supporting the 
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need for stronger CG. All public-companies must be 
careful when selecting executives and top-level 
managers. These are the people who set the tone for 
the company: if there is corruption at the top, it is 
bound to trickle-down. Also, separate the role of CEO 
and Chairman of the Board. Splitting up the roles, 
thus, helps avoid situations like the one at Satyam. 
The Satyam Computer Services’ scandal brought to 
light the importance of ethics and its relevance to corpo- 
rate culture. The fraud committed by the founders of 
Satyam is a testament to the fact that “the science of 
conduct” is swayed in large by human greed, ambition, 
and hunger for power, money, fame and glory.  
5. Conclusions 
Recent corporate frauds and the outcry for transparency 
and honesty in reporting have given rise to two outcomes. 
First, forensic accounting skills have become very crucial 
in untangling the complicated accounting maneuvers that 
have obfuscated financial statements. Second, public 
demand for change and subsequent regulatory action has 
transformed CG scenario across the globe. In fact, both 
these trends have the common goal of addressing the 
investors’ concerns about the transparent financial re- 
porting system. The failure of the corporate communica- 
tion structure, therefore, has made the financial commu- 
nity realize that “there is a great need for skilled profes- 
sionals that can identify, expose, and prevent structural 
weaknesses in three key areas: poor corporate govern- 
ance, flawed internal controls, and fraudulent financial 
statements [36]. In addition, the CG framework needs to 
be first of all strengthened and then implemented in “let- 
ter as well as in right spirit”. The increasing rate of 
white-collar crimes, without doubt, demands stiff penal- 
ties and punishments.  
Perhaps, no financial fraud had a greater impact on 
accounting and auditing profession than Enron, World- 
Com, and recently, India’s Enron: “Satyam”. All these 
frauds have led to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
in July 2002, and a new federal agency and financial 
standard-setting body, the Public Companies Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB). It also was the impetus for 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ 
(AICPA) adoption of SAS No. 99, “Consideration of 
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit” [37]. But it may be 
that the greatest impact of Enron and WorldCom was in 
the significant increased focus and awareness related to 
fraud. It establishes external auditors’ responsibility to 
plan and perform audits to provide a reasonable assur- 
ance that the audited financial statements are free of ma- 
terial frauds.  
As part of this research study, one of the key objectives 
was “to examine and analyze in-depth the Satyam Com- 
puters Limited’s accounting scandal by portraying the 
sequence of events, the aftermath of events, the key par- 
ties involved, major reforms undertaken in India, and 
learn some lessons from it”. Unlike Enron, which sank 
due to “agency” problem, Satyam was brought to its knee 
due to “tunneling”. The Satyam scandal highlights the 
importance of securities laws and CG in emerging mar- 
kets. There is a broad consensus that emerging market 
countries must strive to create a regulatory environment 
in their securities markets that fosters effective CG. India 
has managed its transition into a global economy well, 
and although it suffers from CG issues, it is not alone as 
both developed countries and emerging countries ex- 
perience accounting and CG scandals. The Satyam scan- 
dal brought to light, once again, the importance of ethics 
and its relevance to corporate culture. The fraud com- 
mitted by the founders of Satyam is a testament to the 
fact that “the science of conduct is swayed in large by 
human greed, ambition, and hunger for power, money, 
fame and glory”. All kind of scandals/frauds have proven 
that there is a need for good conduct based on strong 
ethics. The Indian government, in Satyam case, took very 
quick actions to protect the interest of the investors, 
safeguard the credibility of India, and the nation’s image 
across the world. Moreover, Satyam fraud has forced the 
government to re-write CG rules and tightened the norms 
for auditors and accountants. The Indian affiliate of PwC 
“routinely failed to follow the most basic audit proce- 
dures. The SEC and the PCAOB fined the affiliate, PwC 
India, $7.5 million which was described as the largest 
American penalty ever against a foreign accounting firm” 
[38]. According to President, ICAI (January 25, 2011), 
“The Satyam scam was not an accounting or auditing 
failure, but one of CG. This apex body had found the two 
PWC auditors prima-facie guilty of professional mis- 
conduct”. The CBI, which investigated the Satyam fraud 
case, also charged the two auditors with “complicity in 
the commission of the fraud by consciously overlooking 
the accounting irregularities”. 
The culture at Satyam, especially dominated by the 
board, symbolized an unethical culture. On one hand, his 
rise to stardom in the corporate world, coupled with im- 
mense pressure to impress investors, made Mr. Raju a 
“compelled leader to deliver outstanding results”. On the 
contrary, Mr. Raju had to suppress his own morals and 
values in favor of the greater good of the company. The 
board connived with his actions and stood as a blind 
spectator; the lure of big compensation to members fur- 
ther encouraged such behavior. But, in the end, truth is 
sought and those violating the legal, ethical, and societal 
norms are taken to task as per process of law. The public 
confession of fraud by Mr. Ramalinga Raju speaks of 
integrity still left in him as an individual. His acceptance 
of guilt and blame for the whole fiasco shows a bright 
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spot of an otherwise “tampered” character. After quitting 
as Satyam’s Chairman, Raju said, “I am now prepared to 
subject myself to the laws of land and face consequences 
thereof”. Mr. Raju had many ethical dilemmas to face, 
but his persistent immoral reasoning brought his own 
demise. The fraud finally had to end and the implications 
were having far reaching consequences. Thus, Satyam 
scam was not an accounting or auditing failure, but one 
of CG. Undoubtedly, the government of India took 
prompt actions to protect the interest of the investors and 
safeguard the credibility of India and the nation’s image 
across the world. In addition, the CG framework needs to 
be strengthened, implemented both in “letter as well as in 
right spirit”, and enforced vigorously to curb white-collar 
crimes. 
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Annexure: Satyam’s Founder, Chairman  
and CEO, Mr. Raju’s Letter to His Board of  
Directors 
To The Board of Directors, 
Satyam Computer Services Ltd. 
From: B. Ramalinga Raju 
Chairman, Satyam Computer Services Ltd. 
January 7, 2009 
Dear Board Members, 
It is with deep regret, and tremendous burden that I am 
carrying on my conscience, that I would like to bring the 
following facts to your notice: 
1) The Balance Sheet carries as of September 30, 
2008: 
a) Inflated (non-existent) cash and bank balances of Rs. 
5040 crore (as against Rs. 5361 crore reflected in the 
books); b) An accrued interest of Rs. 376 crore which is 
non-existent; c) An understated liability of Rs. 1230 
crore on account of funds arranged by me; and d) An 
over stated debtors position of Rs. 490 crore (as against 
Rs. 2651 reflected in the books). 
2) For the September quarter (Q2), we reported a 
revenue of Rs. 2700 crore and an operating margin of Rs. 
649 crore (24% of revenues) as against the actual reve-
nues of Rs. 2112 crore and an actual operating margin of 
Rs. 61 crore (3% of revenues). This has resulted in artifi-
cial cash and bank balances going up by Rs. 588 crore in 
Q2 alone. 
The gap in the Balance Sheet has arisen purely on ac- 
count of inflated profits over a period of last several 
years (limited only to Satyam standalone, books of sub- 
sidiaries reflecting true performance). What started as a 
marginal gap between actual operating profit and the one 
reflected in the books of accounts continued to grow over 
the years. It has attained unmanageable proportions as 
the size of company operations grew significantly (annu- 
alized revenue run rate of Rs. 11,276 crore in the Sep- 
tember quarter, 2008 and official reserves of Rs. 8392 
crore). The differential in the real profits and the one 
reflected in the books was further accentuated by the fact 
that the company had to carry additional resources and 
assets to justify higher level of operations—thereby sig-
nificantly increasing the costs. 
Every attempt made to eliminate the gap failed. As the 
promoters held a small percentage of equity, the concern 
was that poor performance would result in a take-over, 
thereby exposing the gap. It was like riding a tiger, not 
knowing how to get off without being eaten. 
The aborted Maytas acquisition deal was the last at-
tempt to fill the fictitious assets with real ones. Maytas’ 
investors were convinced that this is a good divestment 
opportunity and a strategic fit. Once Satyam’s problem 
was solved, it was hoped that Maytas’ payments can be 
delayed. But that was not to be. What followed in the last 
several days is common knowledge. 
I would like the Board to know: 
1) That neither myself, nor the Managing Director (in-
cluding our spouses) sold any shares in the last eight 
years—excepting for a small proportion declared and 
sold for philanthropic purposes. 
2) That in the last two years a net amount of Rs. 1230 
crore was arranged to Satyam (not reflected in the books 
of Satyam) to keep the operations going by resorting to 
pledging all the promoter shares and raising funds from 
known sources by giving all kinds of assurances (State- 
ment enclosed, only to the members of the board). Sig- 
nificant dividend payments, acquisitions, capital expen- 
diture to provide for growth did not help matters. Every 
attempt was made to keep the wheel moving and to en- 
sure prompt payment of salaries to the associates. The 
last straw was the selling of most of the pledged share by 
the lenders on account of margin triggers. 
3) That neither me, nor the Managing Director took 
even one rupee/dollar from the company and have not 
benefited in financial terms on account of the inflated 
results. 
4) None of the board members, past or present, had 
any knowledge of the situation in which the company is 
placed. Even business leaders and senior executives in 
the company, such as, Ram Mynampati, Subu D., T. R. 
Anand, Keshab Panda, Virender Agarwal, A. S. Murthy, 
Hari T., S. V. Krishnan, Vijay Prasad, Manish Mehta, 
Murali V., Sriram Papani, Kiran Kavale, Joe Lagioia, 
Ravindra Penumetsa, Jayaraman and Prabhakar Gupta 
are unaware of the real situation as against the books of 
accounts. None of my or Managing Director’s immediate 
or extended family members has any idea about these 
issues. 
Having put these facts before you, I leave it to the 
wisdom of the board to take the matters forward. How-
ever, I am also taking the liberty to recommend the fol-
lowing steps: 
1) A Task Force has been formed in the last few days 
to address the situation arising out of the failed Maytas 
acquisition attempt. This consists of some of the most 
accomplished leaders of Satyam: Subu D., T. R. Anand, 
Keshab Panda and Virender Agarwal, representing busi- 
ness functions, and A. S. Murthy, Hari T. and Murali V. 
representing support functions. I suggest that Ram My- 
nampati be made the Chairman of this Task Force to 
immediately address some of the operational matters on 
hand. Ram can also act as an interim CEO reporting to 
the board. 
2) Merrill Lynch can be entrusted with the task of 
quickly exploring some Merger opportunities. 
3) You may have a “restatement of accounts” prepared 
by the auditors in light of the facts that I have placed 
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before you. I have promoted and have been associated 
with Satyam for well over twenty years now. I have seen 
it grow from few people to 53,000 people, with 185 For-
tune 500 companies as customers and operations in 66 
countries. Satyam has established an excellent leadership 
and competency base at all levels. I sincerely apologize 
to all Satyamites and stakeholders, who have made Sat-
yam a special organization, for the current situation. I am 
confident they will stand by the company in this hour of 
crisis. In light of the above, I fervently appeal to the 
board to hold together to take some important steps. Mr. 
T. R. Prasad is well placed to mobilize support from the 
government at this crucial time. With the hope that 
members of the Task Force and the financial advisor, 
Merrill Lynch (now Bank of America) will stand by the 
company at this crucial hour, I am marking copies of this 
statement to them as well. 
Under the circumstances, I am tendering my resigna- 
tion as the chairman of Satyam and shall continue in this 
position only till such time the current board is expanded. 
My continuance is just to ensure enhancement of the 
board over the next several days or as early as possible. 
I am now prepared to subject myself to the laws of the 
land and face consequences thereof. 
Signature 
(B. Ramalinga Raju) 
(Source: Bombay Stock Exchange; Security and Ex-
change Board of India, available at www.sebi.gov.in) 
 
